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C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 001976

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [NP](#)
SUBJECT: MK NEPAL DECRIES SLOW ARMS MANAGEMENT, PEACE
PROCESS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1576
[1](#)B. KATHMANDU 1865

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nick Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY

[1](#)1. (C) In a July 21 meeting with CDA, CPN-UML Secretary General Madhav Kumar Nepal complained about the sluggishness in decision-making about managing Maoist and Nepal Army weapons, the interim constitution, the interim government, and the inability of the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and GON to agree on strategies for these issues. MK Nepal stressed that arms management was the most important issue, but that it required a wider perspective than saying "Maoists must disarm." He stated that people needed to focus on Maoist commitment to joining a democratic society. He pointed out that the Nepal Army (NA) had a responsibility to democratic society as well. MK Nepal explained his preference for a comprehensive draft of the interim constitution (rather than one limited in scope) and an inclusive interim government. Throughout the meeting, the CPN-UML leader complained that his SPA counterparts were not speaking out honestly about peace process issues and that the GON was neglecting its responsibility to learn about the best options. End Summary.

ARMS MANAGEMENT: MAOIST COMMITMENT, NEPAL ARMY RESPONSIBILITY

[1](#)2. (C) On July 21, MK Nepal stressed to CDA that the management of Maoist and Nepal Army weapons was the most crucial issue facing the GON. However, he emphasized the responsibility the Nepal Army had to upholding democratic principles. MK Nepal commented that Maoist behavior with regard to implementing the June 16 eight-point agreement (ref A) would gauge their commitment to integrating into democracy after arms management. MK Nepal warned that the Maoists were not yet ready to commit and said that they wanted to gain more power through intimidation and force.

[1](#)3. (C) The CPN-UML leader repeatedly underscored the need for Nepal Army impartiality. He insisted that the politicization of the Army must stop, and that the Army not favor any of the political parties or the Palace. The Army should be an apolitical and professional organization loyal only to the state, he said.

TIME TO SETTLE LOGISTICS FOR ARMS MANAGEMENT

14. (C) Despite his discourse about the ideological underpinnings of arms management, MK Nepal declared that the lack of any agreement about the particulars of the subject was a problem. He noted that his preferred method would be for the state to control both Maoist and Nepal Army weapons. There would be a transitional period during which Maoists would be unarmed and have limited mobility throughout the country in order to campaign for constituent assembly elections.

15. (C) CDA asked how the GON would decide about an arms management strategy. MK Nepal replied that the GON first had to finalize the cease-fire, human rights, and peace accords, as well as a comprehensive agreement for the reintegration of Maoist cadres into society. CDA wondered whether the SPA and GON would forge and maintain consensus. MK Nepal alluded to "one party" that would ruin SPA unity, and named the People's Front Nepal (PFN) when pressed. MK Nepal claimed that the PFN--the SPA party with the closest ties to the Maoists--would not consent to a hardline approach. He was confident that the other six parties could reach an agreement with lobbying pressure from the CPN-UML and Nepali Congress (NC).

IN THE INTERIM: CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT

16. (C) MK Nepal announced his preference for a full-length interim constitution based on the 1990 Constitution and the eight-point agreement, which a newly-elected Parliament could

pass into permanent status. He acknowledged that a full-length draft would be tricky because the GON had too many decisions to make about issues of the state, but he rejected the idea of a three- or four-page document that would be a shadow of the 1990 Constitution and limited to how the interim government should operate. MK Nepal recommended that the SPA and at least one other non-SPA political party form a steering committee to establish an interim government with all of the rights of a permanent government. He said that the interim government should include members of both houses of Parliament, other political party representatives, and the "proper percentage" of Maoists.

NOT ENOUGH INFORMED PEOPLE SPEAKING UP

17. (C) MK Nepal blamed the political muddle on the inability of SPA and GON leaders to speak their minds about how the peace process should progress. He attributed part of the problem to SPA indecision about how to counter the Maoists with a united front. MK Nepal emphasized that the GON negotiation team members had the responsibility to "do their homework," and he criticized them for facing the Maoists unprepared. The CPN-UML leader claimed that he had tried to convince the GON and NC to consult experts to discover a win/win solution to deal with the Maoists. In frustration, he said, he recently took the initiative to meet with military experts to discuss options for the management of arms.

COMMENT

18. (C) MK Nepal, like other SPA leaders, continues to struggle with conceptualizing the vague term "arms management." The CPN-UML leader is participating in the SPA-wide search for arms management models, with great expectations for the arrival of the UN experts on July 26.
DEAN